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Abstract: The technologies of model-based design and dependability analysis in the design of dependable 
systems, including software intensive systems, have advanced in recent years. Much of this development 
can be attributed to the application of advances in formal logic and its application to fault forecasting and 
verification of systems. In parallel, work on bio-inspired technologies has shown potential for the 
evolutionary design of engineering systems via automated exploration of potentially large design spaces. 
We have not yet seen the emergence of a design paradigm that effectively combines these two 
techniques, schematically founded on the two pillars of formal logic and biology, throughout the design 
lifecycle. Such a design paradigm would apply these techniques synergistically and systematically from 
the early stages of design to enable optimal refinement of new designs which can be driven effectively by 
dependability requirements. The paper sketches such a model-centric paradigm for the design of 
dependable systems that brings these technologies together to realise their combined potential benefits.   
Keywords: dependability, safety integrity levels, genetic algorithms, MBSA, HiP-HOPS 

1. INTRODUCTION 
Dependability is an umbrella term that covers safety, 
reliability, availability, maintainability and security. 
Integrated and effective dependability assessment has 
become increasingly important as modern safety-critical 
systems become more heterogeneous and complex. 
Dependability  assessment should  begin  early  in  the  
design  so  that potential  problems  can  be  identified  and 
rectified  early  to  avoid  expensive  changes  later  in  the  
system lifecycle. Traditional dependability analysis 
techniques like fault tree analysis (FTA) and Failure Modes 
and Effects Analysis (FMEA) are well-established and 
widely used during the design phase of safety-critical 
systems. However, these techniques are manual processes 
and often performed on informal system models which may 
rapidly become out of date as the system design evolves. This 
presents challenges in maintaining the consistency and 
completeness of the assessment process.  
Over the past 20 years, new developments in the field of 
dependability engineering have led to a body of work on 
model-based assessment and prediction of dependability 
which has come to be known as Model-Based Safety 
Assessment (MBSA). MBSA focuses on safety but extends 
to other attributes of dependability including reliability, 
availability, and even assessment of implications of security 
on safety. Model-based techniques offer significant 
advantages over traditional approaches as they utilise 
software automation and integration with design models to 
simplify the analysis of complex safety-critical systems.  
The various MBSA techniques generally fall into two leading 
paradigms. The first focuses on the automatic construction of 
predictive system failure analyses, such as fault trees or 
FMEAs, from local failure logic stored in the architectural 
model of the system, or a parallel error model. This approach 
is typically compositional, meaning that system-level failure 
analyses can be generated from component-level failure logic 
and the topology of the system. This compositionality lends 
itself well to automation and reuse of component failure logic 
across applications, and this is beneficial to dependability 
analysis in ways similar to those introduced by reuse of 
trusted software components in software engineering. 
Techniques which are based upon this paradigm include the 
Failure Propagation and Transformation Notation (Fenelon 
and McDermid, 1993) and Calculus (Wallace, 2005), 
Hierarchically Performed Hazard Origin and Propagation 
Studies (HiP-HOPS) (Papadopoulos and McDermid, 1999), 
Component Fault Trees (Kaiser et al., 2003) and State-Event 
Fault Trees (Grunske et al., 2005).  
The second prominent MBSA paradigm focuses on 
automatically analysing potential failures in a system model, 
typically represented as a state machine, using formal 
verification techniques such as model-checking. This 
generally works by injecting possible faults into an 
executable formal specification of a system and studying the 
effects of faults on the system behaviour. The results are then 
used by model checking tools to verify whether system 
dependability requirements are being satisfied or whether 
violations of the requirements exist in normal or faulty 
conditions. Techniques in this category include Altarica 
(Arnold et al., 2000), FSAP-NuSMV (Bozzano and 
Villafiorita, 2007),  SAML (Ortmeier et al., 2012) and 
PRISM (Kwiatkowska et al, 2009).  
  
     
 
Much of this recent work on dependability analysis has a 
natural synergy with a wider trend towards model-based 
design, particularly domain-specific languages. In many 
industries, particularly transport and aerospace, designers are 
increasingly adopting Architecture Description Languages 
(ADLs) to capture architectural and behavioural information 
about the system. Such ADLs may not only represent the 
architecture of the system, but also its functional and non-
functional requirements; they may also provide facilities for 
the refinement of the system throughout the design lifecycle, 
showing how the requirements are being met at each stage. 
One important goal of such ADLs is to represent safety 
requirements and the failure logic of the system, and this has 
naturally led to integration with MBSA techniques.  
Some of this work has been transferred to the context of 
model-based design. For instance, ADLs have incorporated 
error modelling semantics that enable dependability analysis. 
Recent work has demonstrated that dependability analysis of 
EAST-ADL models (Chen et al., 2011) and SysML models 
(Andrews et al., 2013) is possible via HiP-HOPS while 
dependability analysis of AADL models is possible via 
conversion to combinatorial (Joshi et al., 2007) and temporal/ 
dynamic fault trees (Mahmud et al., 2012; Merle et al., 2014) 
or Generalised Stochastic Petri Nets (GSPN) (Feiler and 
Rugina, 2007). 
This work is very much ongoing and there are specific 
challenges to be addressed within individual techniques and 
the field as a whole.  
In this paper, we firstly discuss a set of challenges that in our 
view cannot be addressed by MBSA in its current state. 
These challenges mainly refer to design problems where 
there are many potential design options to be considered. 
Secondly, we argue that a synthesis of these techniques with 
modern metaheuristics for search and optimisation can 
potentially address these challenges. Finally, we describe our 
work towards this goal within the HiP-HOPS method and 
tool, and we show how this work can support cost-optimal, 
dependability-directed design refinement and optimisation of 
system architectures.  
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, we discuss 
challenges; in Section 3, we present an extension of MBSA 
with metaheuristics; in Section 4, we discuss some of the 
technical challenges and limitations of the work; in Section 5, 
we discuss related work elsewhere in the literature, and in 
Section 6 we conclude by discussing how this work could 
inform the evolution of MBSA.  
2. CHALLENGES 
MBSA techniques can answer important questions regarding 
the quality of individual design proposals, and in that sense 
they can enrich a model-driven development process. 
However, MBSA is neither a panacea in its various forms nor 
is it a static field of research. Rather it is a set of techniques 
which are continuously evolving to address current and new 
challenges. Below we identify four such challenges which 
MBSA techniques cannot fully address at present. 
2.1. Controlling dependability from the early stages  
There is increasing agreement that to achieve high 
dependability in complex systems, design processes should 
move in a direction where dependability and other quality 
attributes are controlled from the early stages rather than left 
to emerge (or not) at the end. This is clearly a very desirable 
goal that would greatly benefit several industries, and it is 
enshrined in contemporary standards like the aerospace and 
the automotive safety standards, ARP4754-A and ISO 26262. 
These documents prescribe processes in which dependability 
requirements, captured early through system level hazard 
analysis and risk assessment, are rationally allocated to 
progressively more refined subsystem elements of the 
architecture in the form of Development Assurance Levels, 
Safety Integrity Levels, or other similar concepts.  
A study of the problem (Parker et al., 2013) has shown that 
the manual processes described in the standards become 
complex when applied to large or even medium-sized 
networked architectures which deliver multiple functions; 
such systems lead to huge numbers of potential allocation 
solutions and exploring these manually is infeasible. Current 
standards do not advise on how this type of allocation can be 
done effectively, for example with the support of automated 
algorithms and tools. This is an area where research 
opportunities arise to address important questions: for 
instance, which architectural proposals will fulfil 
dependability requirements better in the context of design 
refinement, and, given a proposed architecture, how integrity 
requirements can be optimally allocated to its elements.   
2.2 Controlled design refinement over a complex value chain  
The controlled refinement of a design for new dependable 
systems must be achieved in the context of a value chain over 
which the design and procurement of subsystems and 
components is typically distributed. Indeed, in practice, 
complex systems are developed in value chains using a 
combination of existing and commissioned subsystems and 
components that become parts of the overall architecture. 
Distributing a design in such a way that properties are 
verifiably maintained is a significant challenge that 
encompasses two aspects. On the one hand, effective top-
down mechanisms are needed to ensure that the allocation 
and transmission of requirements during refinement is done 
in a way that satisfies overall requirements at the end. On the 
other hand, bottom-up mechanisms are needed to provide 
evidence that requirements have been met when the system is 
finally put together in its final form. 
2.3 Dealing with the inevitable design changes  
There is always a degree of uncertainty in early design, which 
often contributes to disruptive design changes. Some of the 
uncertainty comes as existing requirements are modified and 
new requirements are added, causing changes in the current 
design and allocation of requirements. These changes need to 
propagate in a top-down manner through the design 
refinement as new and modified requirements for the 
elements of the design. For example, a previously 
undiscovered hazard may cause design changes aimed at 
addressing the hazard and these may need to propagate 
  
     
 
through subsystems to the low levels of design and to the low 
level tiers of the value chain. Uncertainties in design may 
also propagate bottom up, for example in cases where 
assumptions about certain properties of elements cannot be 
satisfied. The challenge here is in being able to respond 
effectively and efficiently to the changes that need to follow. 
The impact of such changes should be localised and any 
necessary reallocation of requirements must be done 
efficiently and with minimum disruption to the contractual 
relationships between the various stakeholders in the tiers of 
the value chain. 
2.4 Trading off dependability versus cost & other properties. 
In complex distributed systems, rich functionalities and their 
distribution across shared hardware and communication 
channels allow a large number of configuration options at 
design time and a large number of reconfiguration options at 
runtime. This creates challenges in design because, as 
potential design spaces expand, their exploration for suitable 
or optimal designs becomes increasingly difficult.  
When a number of different architectural configurations can 
potentially deliver the functions of a system, designers are 
faced with a difficult optimisation problem. Assuming that it 
is technically and economically possible to fulfil all 
dependability requirements, they must find an architecture 
that entails minimal development and other lifecycle costs. 
On the other hand, if fulfilling or optimising all dependability 
and other requirements is infeasible, then they must find the 
architecture or architectures that achieve the best possible 
tradeoffs among quality attributes and cost. The problem is 
compounded by the fact that attributes are often conflicting, 
e.g. improving safety often means not only increasing costs 
but also reducing availability.  
It is widely accepted that these trade-offs represent hard, 
multi-objective optimisation problems that require 
optimisation algorithms that can search in large design 
spaces.  
Although many design problems can be tackled effectively 
only by the human intellect, as design spaces expand, finding 
optimal designs in terms of quality and cost becomes 
increasingly difficult and some automation is needed. 
Modelling languages, emerging ADLs, and MBSA 
techniques could therefore benefit from concepts and 
technological support that enable this type of optimisation. 
3. SYNTHESIS OF MBSA WITH METAHEURISTICS 
The above challenges go beyond the capabilities of current 
MBSA techniques. We believe one step towards addressing 
them is to achieve a synthesis of MBSA and contemporary 
metaheuristics, i.e., moving into an area where formal logic 
can meet biology and nature-inspired techniques.  
In recent years, we have been working in this direction in the 
context of HiP-HOPS, an MBSA technique which has been 
developed since the late 90s (Papadopoulos and McDermid, 
1999). While HiP-HOPS started as a technique for model-
based synthesis of fault trees and FMEAs, it has 
progressively evolved into a more sophisticated method in 
which heuristics are used to address the design problems 
highlighted in section 2 — see for instance (Papadopoulos 
and Grante, 2003 & 2006), (Zeng et al., 2007), (Adachi et al., 
2011), (Papadopoulos et al., 2011) (Walker et al., 2013) and 
(Azevedo et al., 2014).  
The approach has been implemented as a prototype tool of 
the same name with a broad spectrum of capabilities for 
dependability analysis, architectural optimisation, and safety 
requirement allocation. Versions are in use by industrial 
partners including Volvo, Honda, Toyota, Embraer, 
Honeywell, and others. 
3.1 Scope of HiP-HOPS  
HiP-HOPS aspires to support both sides of the V engineering 
lifecycle with techniques that are model-based and automated 
(Fig. 1).   
 
Fig. 1. Scope of HiP-HOPS in the V-lifecycle 
At the early stages, HiP-HOPS supports a dependability 
driven mode of design in which system requirements are 
captured early and are allocated to sub-systems and 
components of the architecture. In a typical design the 
possibilities for allocation are numerous, so the process is 
partly automated via use of metaheuristics. The goal is to find 
an optimal allocation of system requirements to elements of 
the architecture within the space of all possible such 
allocations. Optimality here is defined mainly in terms of 
minimising the projected costs that would be associated with 
the different levels of integrity demanded from components 
to meet system requirements (Azevedo et al., 2014), thereby 
assisting the designers in developing a solution that meets 
dependability requirements but minimising costs within the 
constraints of an established cost budget. This process can be 
repeated as the system design continues to evolve and is 
described in section 3.2. 
As the architecture of the system is refined and more detailed 
models of the system are produced, more detailed qualitative 
and quantitative dependability analysis can also be 
performed.  Such analyses may be used as evidence that the 
system requirements have been met. The process is 
automated via algorithms for synthesis and analysis of fault 
trees and FMEAs (Papadopoulos et al., 1999 & 2011) and is 
described in section 3.3.  
  
     
 
Moving to the right of the V-lifecycle, and assuming that 
dependability analysis shows that requirements cannot be met 
by the current system architecture, it is possible to initiate a 
process of architecture and maintenance optimisation in 
which the goal is to arrive at an improved architecture which 
meets dependability and other requirements with minimal 
additional costs. The process is once more driven by meta-
heuristics and can be used to address problems such as the 
optimal selection of components and subsystems between 
available alternatives, decisions on the location and level of 
replication of components (Adachi et al., 2011), and 
decisions on maintenance scheduling (Nggada, et al., 2013). 
This is described in section 3.4.  
Finally, in section 3.5, we also discuss how the HiP-HOPS 
approach can be used in conjunction with architecture 
description languages (ADLs), which provide an integrated 
framework and systematic methodology for the kind of V-
lifecycle described here. 
3.2 Dependability-driven Design Refinement with HiP-HOPS 
Many MBSA approaches are bottom up in that they rely on 
the prior existence of detailed system models that can be 
subjected to analysis or optimisation. As a counterpoint, we 
would like to pose a set of fundamental questions about 
system design.  
a)  Why should designers need to produce detailed designs 
before they can assess whether dependability 
requirements have been met, e.g. via MBSA?  
b)  Why should designers risk failing to meet requirements 
and then need to redesign?   
c)  Why not employ a top-down dependability-driven design 
process in which dependability requirements can be 
optimally allocated to sub-systems and components 
during refinement of the architecture?  
The aspirations implied in the above questions concur with 
those expressed in modern safety standards. Using ISO 
26262 (ISO, 2011) as an example, the standard defines a V-
shaped safety lifecycle (shown below in Fig. 2). On the left 
of the 'V', safety requirements are established on the basis of 
a hazard analysis of the item being developed. These are then 
allocated in a top-down fashion to emerging system elements 
as the system architecture is continually refined from an 
abstract functional model to a more concrete hardware & 
software  architecture. On the right of the 'V', the resulting 
architecture is then validated against the original 
requirements through a process of analysis and safety 
assessment.    
 
Fig. 2. ISO 26262 V-model development process (ISO, 2011) 
 
However, the guidance provided by these standards assumes 
requirements allocation is a manual process. We believe that 
an automated approach can better support the application of 
these standards and yield important improvements in the 
ongoing pursuit of improved design processes for dependable 
systems. 
Standards such as IEC 61508 (IEC, 1998), ISO 26262, and 
ARP4754-A (SAE, 2010) introduce a system of classification 
for different levels of safety-integrity. IEC 61508 popularised 
the Safety Integrity Level (SIL), while ISO 26262 and 
ARP4754-A introduced domain-specific versions of this 
concept — the Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) for 
the automotive domain and the Development Assurance 
Level (DAL) for the aerospace domain. Integrity levels serve 
as a qualitative indication of the required level of safety or 
integrity of a function or component. Generally they are 
broken down into 5 levels, ranging from strict requirements 
(e.g. SIL4, ASIL D, DAL A) to no special requirements (e.g. 
SIL0, QM, DAL E). In some cases, quantitative targets are 
also associated with different levels, e.g. maximum failure 
rates for random hardware faults. 
These integrity levels are employed as part of a top-down 
requirements allocation process as well as a bottom-up 
verification of those requirements. For example, as Fig. 2 
shows, ISO 26262 describes a detailed safety process to be 
applied to automotive systems. The first step is a hazard 
analysis, which identifies the various malfunctions that may 
take place and the hazards that may arise as a result. The 
severity, likelihood, and controllability of these hazards are 
then considered. On the basis of this risk analysis, safety 
requirements — with associated ASILs — are applied to the 
various top-level functions of the system. The higher the risk 
of the function’s hazard, the higher the ASIL that is applied.  
During the subsequent development of the system, 
traceability to these original ASILs must be maintained at all 
times. As the system design is refined into more detailed 
  
     
 
architectures, those original ASILs are allocated and 
decomposed to the subsystems and terminal components of 
the design. During the verification and validation, analyses 
(e.g. fault trees) must be produced to ensure that the refined 
system and — eventually — the final implemented system 
still meets the original requirements. 
The process of allocating and decomposing ASILs across the 
architecture is far from straightforward. In general, the sub-
components are responsible for providing the required 
integrity level of their parent. To avoid every element of the 
entire system having to meet the highest level of integrity, the 
different contribution of elements of the architecture to the 
numerous hazards predicted must be accurately established. 
Fault tolerant architectures (e.g. parallelism, redundancy, 
monitoring etc) can also be employed to spread the burden of 
meeting a high SIL across a number of components. While in 
some cases there is guidance on how this is to be done, 
achieving it in practice is often significantly more difficult. 
For example, ISO 26262 provides an "ASIL algebra", which 
indicates how a strict integrity level like ASIL D can be met 
by two independent subsystems which each individually  
meet lower ASILs, as shown in Table 1.  
Table 1- Possible ASIL allocations for two subsystems 
To meet ASIL D Subsystem 1 Subsystem 2 
Option 1 QM D 
Option 2 A C 
Option 3 B B 
Option 4 C A 
Option 5 D QM 
Note that there are many other possible combinations, but 
either these will not meet the overall ASIL D requirement or 
they will exceed it and thus incur unnecessary expense. The 
ASIL algebra can be thought of as a set of integer values for 
each ASIL (see Table ). 
Table 2- The ASIL algebra 
ASIL Value 
QM 0 
A 1 
B 2 
C 3 
D 4 
Assigning ASIL C and ASIL D to both subsystems would 
meet the overall requirement, i.e., 3 + 4 ≥ 4, but is inefficient. 
Assigning ASIL A and ASIL B would not meet the overall 
requirement, i.e., 1 + 2 < 4. The most efficient allocations 
precisely meet the overall requirement, and these are shown 
in Table 1. 
Thus there are problems in ensuring that constraints about 
components' failure independence are met, working through 
the many possible allocations, and ensuring that the 
decomposed low-level requirements still add up to the 
original high-level requirements. When dealing with the 
types of detailed electronic architectures that are common in 
modern safety-critical systems, following safety standards 
like ISO 26262 and ARP4754-A manually with respect to 
SIL allocation requires additional time and expense and is 
often infeasible. Even when considering only two 
subsystems, there are 25 (i.e., 52) possible ASIL allocations, 
of which only 5 are 'optimal' in the sense that they precisely 
meet the overall requirement. The scope of the problem only 
grows when more subsystems and more system-wide 
requirements are considered. 
Standards are naturally focused on safety and SIL allocation 
is presented as a problem where the single goal is to find an 
allocation of integrity requirements to components of the 
system architecture that meets system level integrity targets. 
HiP-HOPS, however, explores an additional dimension of the 
problem, which is very relevant for developers of systems: 
cost. Consider the earlier example where there are 5 different 
options to decompose an ASIL D across two redundant 
components. Which one should be selected? While all of the 
options are valid with respect to ISO 26262, some will likely 
be more costly — typically those assigned high ASILs such 
as C and D. Clearly, the allocation that minimises SIL-
dependent costs is preferred, and in this case that might mean 
allocating ASIL B to both subsystems. Table  shows how an 
abstract measure of cost can be observed using a simple cost 
heuristic in which QM has a cost of 0, ASIL A has a cost of 
1, ASIL B a cost of 10, C a cost of 100, and D a cost of 100. 
Table 3- Allocating ASILs with a cost heuristic 
Subsystem 1 Subsystem 2 Overall cost 
QM (cost = 0) D (cost = 1000) 0 + 1000 = 1000 
A (cost = 1) C (cost = 100) 1 + 100 = 101 
B (cost = 10) B (cost = 10) 10 + 10 = 20 
C (cost = 100) A (cost = 1) 100 + 1 = 101 
D (cost = 1000) QM (cost = 0) 1000 + 0 = 1000 
When considering an isolated decomposition decision, as in 
the example above, this might seem like a trivial problem of 
comparing the costs between a few options. Components, 
however, often participate in assuring multiple functions, and 
when trying to find cost-optimal solutions, numerous chains 
of conflicting constraints involving many components need 
to be taken into account. Furthermore, as the number of 
components increases, the number of allocation combinations 
to examine grows, often exponentially. This is a complex 
combinatorial problem where the satisfaction of integrity 
requirements from safety standards is a constraint that must 
be met but where the real objective is the minimisation of 
development costs (Azevedo et al., 2014). 
In HiP-HOPS, a largely automated process for SIL allocation 
and decomposition is available, which is built on the 
  
     
 
dependability analysis framework presented in section 3.3. 
HiP-HOPS can establish the potential contribution of 
combinations of component faults to system level failures. 
From this information, it is then possible to automatically 
perform a allocation and decomposition of requirements. 
HiP-HOPS takes into account the component dependencies 
and can therefore automatically apply the type of SIL 
'algebra' described by ISO 26262 and ARP4754-A. This 
allows SIL allocations to individual components, component 
ports, or even component failure modes. Allocating SILs to 
failure modes allows a more efficient refinement of 
requirements because when a component can fail in multiple 
ways, only the sub-components causing its most severe 
failures are assigned the higher SIL; sub-components causing 
less serious failures can receive lower integrity levels. 
Work in this area has shown that the number of different 
potential allocation schemes that can meet a complex set of 
system requirements often produces a vast search space, and 
exploring this exhaustively with deterministic optimisation 
algorithms for a cost-optimal allocation can be problematic 
(Parker et al., 2013). Recent work has therefore focused on 
the use of metaheuristics to efficiently explore this large 
space. The resulting allocations of SILs meet the system 
requirements with significantly reduced costs for 
procurement, development and verification of components. 
We have applied and evaluated a range of metaheuristic 
optimisation algorithms in this context: 
 (Parker et al., 2013) applied genetic algorithms to 
allocate SILs in an automotive hybrid braking 
system. Genetic algorithms rely on processes of 
natural evolution to find promising solutions and 
incorporate a random "mutation factor" to avoid 
being caught in local optima. The search space in 
this instance was 5.96 x 1016, small enough to 
exhaustively determine that there were 125 optimal 
allocations. 4 out of 10 runs found the optimal 
solutions, while the other 6 runs found non-optimal 
but very low cost solutions (within a percent or two 
of optimal). Each run took a few seconds. 
 In (Azevedo et al., 2013), Tabu Search was applied 
to the same hybrid braking system according to a 
variety of different cost heuristics. Tabu search is a 
metaheuristic optimisation method which utilises 
memory structures known as the Tabu Tenure, 
applied over a local search heuristic. The Tenure 
allows memorisation of recently found candidates 
which can then be avoided in some of the search’s 
upcoming iterations, allowing more opportunities to 
explore new regions of the search space and helping 
to avoid being trapped in local optima. 9 out of 10 
runs provided optimal solutions for all cost 
heuristics and each run took only a few 
milliseconds. 
 In (Sorokos et al., 2015), a Tabu search-based 
approach was applied to an aircraft wheel brake 
system, using DALs and the different decomposition 
logic set out in ARP4754-A. In this case every run 
of the algorithm produced an optimal solution, 
although the search space was considerably smaller. 
More recently, we have also begun to investigate Particle 
Swarm-based approaches. These use a strategy to explore the 
solution space based on the social behaviour of flocks of 
birds, or schools of fish, in their search for food. The position 
visited by a particle represents a candidate solution; when 
choosing the next position to visit, a particle is influenced by 
the best position it has so far visited and by the best position 
encountered by its neighbours.  
As shown in the above papers, this work has produced 
promising results that indicate good scalability. Prototype 
implementations of the different metaheuristics have been 
incorporated into experimental versions of the HiP-HOPS 
tool and even the slowest (genetic algorithms) can find 
optimal allocations for medium-sized problems in a few 
seconds. Exhaustive search methods and techniques like 
integer linear programming have been shown to take longer 
but with the trade-off that they find a set of solutions that are 
guaranteed optimal (Murashkin et al, 2015). In all cases, even 
when the costs are not optimal, the allocations found always 
meet the overall safety requirements. 
In most cases, HiP-HOPS can now calculate optimal 
allocations of dependability requirements to subsystems and 
components of a system, taking into account their 
dependencies and assumptions about their intended behaviour 
in conditions of failure. Stakeholders in a value chain are able 
to apply this capability iteratively in order to specify 
procurement contracts for the development or purchase of 
sub-components that define increasingly refined 
dependability requirements to suppliers in lower tiers of a 
value chain. The process guarantees that a system will meet 
its dependability requirements at the end of the design 
process providing the various contracts, such as requirements 
on basic components; assumptions of independence etc., have 
been met  
The concept is recursive and can be applied in exactly the 
same fashion between any two tiers of a value chain. It is 
independent of industry and can incorporate different rules 
and algebras, which makes it compatible with a variety of 
contemporary standards from different domains. 
Note that at this stage, the process of SIL decomposition and 
allocation does not involve any changes to the architecture 
itself: we are only allocating requirements to existing sub-
elements of the model, on the basis of overall safety 
requirements derived from system-level hazards. Later, if 
these requirements are shown not to be met by the refined 
system design, we can modify the architecture accordingly, 
as described in section 3.4. 
3.3 Modelling and Dependability Analysis  
At various stages through the V-lifecycle, it is useful to be 
able to perform dependability analysis on the system 
architecture — whether an initial abstract feature model, a 
more refined functional architecture, or a concrete 
hardware/software architecture — to obtain information 
about the possible causes of failures in the system and how 
  
     
 
likely those failures are. This information can be used to 
verify that decomposed safety requirements are being met 
and, if performed iteratively, can also inform the direction of 
the design by highlighting potential weakpoints in the 
system. 
All analysis and optimisation processes in HiP-HOPS are 
performed on an architectural system model which identifies 
material, energy, and data transactions among components 
(Fig. 3).  
 
Fig. 3. Modelling and Dependability Analysis in HiP-HOPS. 
The model can be hierarchical if necessary to manage 
complexity. In the case of a hierarchical model, subsystems 
enclose architectures of more basic subsystems and 
components.  
The dependability analysis process in HiP-HOPS then 
proceeds in three phases. The first phase is the annotation 
phase: each component in the model is annotated with its 
local error logic, describing the errors that can occur in the 
component and how it responds to deviations of its inputs. 
HiP-HOPS defines a language for the description of this error 
logic. In the basic version of this language, the error logic of 
a component can be specified as a list of internal failure 
modes of the component and a list of errors or deviations as 
they can be observed at component outputs. Each component 
failure mode is optionally accompanied by quantitative data, 
for example a failure and a repair rate. Output errors carry 
Boolean expressions which describe their causes as a logical 
combination of component faults and similar errors observed 
at component inputs. For example, to describe an omission of 
output from a component caused by either an omission of 
corresponding input or an internal failure mode, we can say: 
 omission-component.outputPort =  
     internalFailure OR  
     omission-component.inputPort 
Here internalFailure is a failure mode of that 
component and may have probabilistic failure data attached, 
e.g. a failure rate in terms of failures per hour. omission-
component.inputPort represents an error or deviation 
at the component's input port of type "omission", i.e., a lack 
of input. The logical OR operator indicates that the output 
deviation — omission of output — is caused by either the 
internal failure mode or the lack of input to the component. 
Input and output errors referenced in the error logic are 
described qualitatively and typically represent different 
classes of failures, such as the omission or commission of 
parameters or qualitative deviations from correct value (i.e. 
hi/low) and expected timing behaviour (i.e. early/late). These 
are not fixed and analysts may use whatever nomenclature 
they wish as long as the usage is consistent across the model.  
Collectively, a set of failure expressions that logically explain 
all possible errors at all output ports of a component provides 
a model of the error logic of the component under 
examination. This model can be stored in a library. For 
simple components, e.g. sensors and actuators, such models 
could be re-used across different applications to simplify the 
manual part of the analysis and the overall application of the 
proposed technique.   
The second phase of the HiP-HOPS dependability analysis 
process is the synthesis phase. Using the error logic 
associated with components, computerised algorithms 
automatically determine how errors propagate through 
connections in the model to cause functional failures at 
system outputs. These are the failures that analysts are 
typically interested in identifying and analysing. For 
example, in a car, such functional failures may include the 
loss of steering or braking. Since HiP-HOPS shows how 
individual failure modes in components can combine and 
lead to functional failures at system outputs, a system failure 
such as loss of braking may be seen to be the result of an 
actuator failure.  
This global view is captured in a set of interconnected fault 
trees. These fault trees show how the leaf nodes of the trees 
— representing the component failure modes and their local 
effects — can logically combine and propagate though the 
system to cause the top events of the fault trees, which 
represent the functional failures of the system (Veseley et al., 
2002). The interconnections between the trees represent 
dependencies in model, e.g. the failure of a common power 
supply or a global condition that may affect more than one 
system function. Common cause failures, such as flooding of 
physically co-located components, can also be represented in 
HiP-HOPS. 
Once this is done, the third phase of HiP-HOPS is to perform 
analyses of this global system error model: the analysis 
phase. First, an automated fault tree analysis is performed for 
each of the functional failures in the system. HiP-HOPS can 
perform both qualitative and quantitative analysis of fault 
trees. Qualitative analysis is used to establish the minimal cut 
sets of the fault trees — the smallest combinations of failure 
events necessary to cause system failure — which more 
readily indicate how system failures may occur. Quantitative 
analysis is also possible when probabilistic parameters have 
been provided at component level and is used to predict the 
reliability and availability of the system. 
In the final stage of the analysis, the complex body of logic 
encoded in the set of interconnected fault trees is simplified 
by an automated algorithm which translates it into a simple 
table of direct relationships between component and system 
failures. In a similar way to a classical FMEA, this table 
determines, for each component in the system and for each 
  
     
 
failure mode of that component, the effect of that failure 
mode on the system. The table shows which system failures 
(if any) each failure mode causes, both by itself and in 
conjunction with other events.   
Note that in a classical manual FMEA only the effects of 
single failures are typically assessed. Thus, one advantage of 
generating an FMEA from fault trees is that fault trees record 
the effects of combinations of component failures and this 
useful information can also be transferred into the FMEA. 
The FMEA shows all the functional effects to which a 
particular component failure mode contributes, both 
individually and as part of a combination. This is particularly 
useful as a failure mode that contributes to multiple system 
failures is potentially more significant than those that only 
cause a single top event. Consequently, this type of FMEA 
can also help analysts to determine the level of fault tolerance 
in the system, i.e., to determine whether the system can 
tolerate any single failure or any combination of two, three or 
more component failures.   
It is clear that both quantitative and qualitative analyses in 
HiP-HOPS can play a dual role: either to help verify 
requirements or stimulate useful design iterations by 
highlighting weak areas of the design. 
We should note that experimental versions of the tool enable 
use of an extended language where it is also possible to 
express a wider range of failure semantics. For example, 
wildcards can also be used to describe more abstract patterns 
of relationships between output and input deviations. This 
allows statements such as "there will be an omission of all 
outputs in response to any input error" (Wolforth et al., 
2010), which assists in the reuse of error logic descriptions 
across components with different interfaces but similar 
failure behaviour.    
More significantly, recent work has extended the range of 
systems that can be effectively analysed by HiP-HOPS. 
Because it is based on classical Boolean fault tree analysis 
algorithms, traditionally HiP-HOPS was limited to analysing 
only those systems that could be represented with Boolean 
failure behaviour. However, many safety-critical systems 
exhibit more complex behaviour: they may be dynamic, rely 
on sparse or uncertain probabilistic data, or express non-
coherency in their failure logic. 
Experimental versions of HiP-HOPS provide support for all 
of these types of scenarios, as will be explained next. 
3.3.1 Dependability Analysis of Non-Coherent Systems 
Some safety critical systems exhibit non-coherent failure 
behaviour, which means that certain system failures can only 
occur if another event has not occurred. This other event may 
be an ordinary system event or it could be another failure 
event. Such scenarios may occur in multitask or multi-phase 
systems where the causes of system failures can only be 
identified once the system successes have been taken into 
account (Andrews, 2000). For example, a failure in task A 
may only occur if another task B has succeeded: failure of 
task B therefore prohibits failure of task A. In fault trees, this 
condition is typically represented using a NOT gate. 
HiP-HOPS has been extended with the capability to model 
and analyse this type of scenario (Sharvia & Papadopoulos, 
2008). HiP-HOPS failure expressions can include NOT gate 
conditions so that the effects of failures not occurring can 
also be taken into account during system analysis. This 
involves the generation of the prime implicants, i.e., the 
effects of different failure states of multiple components in 
combination, at the expense of a slight performance 
overhead. The resultant fault trees and FMEA tables then 
show that some system failures may only occur if certain 
system conditions or events do not occur.  
3.3.2 Dependability Analysis of Dynamic Systems 
In a dynamic system, the system behaviour changes over 
time. This could be because there are multiple phases of 
operation, e.g. as in an aircraft with distinct take-off, flight, 
and landing phases, or it could be because the system 
behaviour changes in response to different events (whether 
normal system events or failure events). Safety-critical 
systems are increasingly dynamic in nature as they frequently 
include the capacity for partial self-repair in response to 
failure, e.g. through the use of backup components, fallback 
to degraded modes of operation, or automatic detection and 
correction of certain types of errors. 
Classical safety analysis techniques such as FTA and FMEA 
struggle to model these types of scenario. The key 
shortcoming is the inability to distinguish between the effects 
of different sequences of events, not just combinations of 
events.  
Consider the triple redundant system of Fig. 4: 
 
 Fig. 4. Dynamic system with two backup components. 
System functionality is initially provided through component 
'A', which is the primary component. The monitor 'S1' 
observes component A for any deviation of its outputs. If 
detected, the sensor activates component 'B', the first backup 
component, and moves to a degraded mode of operation. 
Similarly, once component B has been activated, monitor 'S2' 
begins monitoring B for output deviations and, if any are 
detected, activates the final backup component 'C'. 
Component 'D' represents the system output. 
A standard FTA of this system might indicate the following 
causes of system failure: 
1. Omission of input to the system 
2. Failure of A and Failure of S1 to detect failure of A 
  
     
 
3. Failure of A and Failure of B and Failure of S2 to 
detect failure of B 
4. Failure of A and Failure of B and Failure of C 
At first glance, these causes would seem to make sense. 
However, they do not take into account the sequence of 
events. For example, consider the second cut set: if 
component A failed first, allowing S1 to activate component 
B, a subsequent failure of S1 would have no further effect on 
the system — it is already running in its degraded mode 
using backup component B. Therefore this cut set is 
pessimistic, as only one sequence (failure of S1 before failure 
of A) will lead to system failure. Similarly, a failure of 
component B before component A means that B will never be 
activated by S1, and thus monitor S2 will never be able to 
activate the final backup component C. In this case, the last 
cut set is optimistic, because some sequences of events will 
result in system failure even without the failure of C. 
To remedy this general problem, a range of temporal and 
dynamic extensions to fault trees have been proposed, such as 
the Dynamic Fault Tree approach (Dugan et al., 1992; 
Veseley et al., 2002). For HiP-HOPS, we have developed an 
extension to the fault tree analysis known as Pandora (Walker 
et al., 2007). The Pandora technique is included as part of 
HiP-HOPS and adds new temporal logic gates to enable fault 
trees to model sequences of events and thus better capture the 
failure behaviour of dynamic systems. 
In particular, Pandora adds three new gates: 
 Priority AND gate (PAND):  X < Y 
 Simultaneous AND gate (SAND): X & Y 
 Priority OR gate (POR):   X | Y 
The PAND gate represents a sequence: event X must occur 
before event Y, but both must occur. The SAND gate 
represents simultaneous occurrence. The POR gate represents 
a condition: event X must occur before event Y if event Y 
occurs at all. 
By defining a set of new temporal laws that apply to these 
gates, analogous to the laws of Boolean logic, Pandora makes 
it possible to perform a qualitative analysis of temporal fault 
trees and obtain the minimal cut sequences — the smallest 
sequences of events necessary to cause the system failure.  
Using Pandora, the minimal cut sequences of the example 
triple redundant system would be as follows: 
1. Omission of input to the system 
2. Failure of S1 before Failure of A 
3. Dormant failure of B before Failure of A 
4. Failure of S2 before Failure of B or A 
5. Failure of A before Failure of B and Failure of C 
These cut sequences better capture the dynamic behaviour of 
the system. The failure of a monitor after the failure of the 
monitored component is no longer modelled as a system 
failure and the scenario where B can fail dormant before A is 
properly represented. 
In the absence of quantitative data, Pandora can provide 
useful insight into system failure. Where quantitative 
component failure data is available, quantitative analysis of 
Pandora fault trees is possible. The analytical approach 
(Edifor et al., 2012, 2013) uses mathematical expressions to 
probabilistically evaluate the Pandora temporal fault tree 
gates based on exponentially distributed failure data. Using 
this approach, analysts can determine the overall reliability of 
a system.  They can also identify the critical parts of the 
system by determining the relative contributions of the 
various system components to the causes of system failure. 
Once the critical parts are identified, reliability may be 
improved by e.g. including redundant components or using 
components with lower failure rates. 
Petri Nets (PNs) have also been used to develop an approach 
for probabilistic evaluation of Pandora fault trees based on 
exponentially distributed data (Kabir et al., 2015). In this 
approach, the fault trees are quantified by translating them 
into Generalised Stochastic Petri Nets (Marsan et al., 1996). 
Similar to the analytical solution, this approach can evaluate 
system reliability and criticality of components. In addition, it 
can also verify the correctness of the qualitative analysis. To 
allow the analysts to perform quantitative analysis of Pandora 
fault trees with any kind of distributions of data, Kabir et al. 
(2014a) have developed a methodology based on Bayesian 
Networks. Although others have developed approaches to 
convert Boolean fault trees to Bayesian Networks (Bobbio et 
al., 2001), this approach instead transforms Pandora temporal 
fault trees to evaluate system reliability and criticality of 
system components.  In addition to the predictive analysis, 
this approach allows the analysts to perform post-hoc 
diagnostic analysis, a process which involves calculating and 
updating the posterior probability of basic events given 
observed evidence of the system failure.      
3.3.3 Dependability Analysis in Conditions of Uncertainty 
As already mentioned, HiP-HOPS can perform quantitative 
analysis to predict the reliability and availability of systems if 
the probabilistic parameters of system components (e.g. 
failure rate or failure probability) can be provided. However, 
this means that the quantitative analysis is entirely dependent 
on the availability of this quantitative failure data. For many 
complex systems, it is often difficult to obtain precise failure 
data of components from past occurrences due to lack of 
knowledge about the systems, scarcity of statistical data, and 
changes in operating environment of the systems (Tanaka et 
al.,1983; Singer, 1990). This situation is particularly relevant 
in the early design phases when system analysts consider new 
or undetermined components for which there is no 
quantitative data. In such situations, expert human judgement 
in linguistic terms, e.g. ‘very low, low, high’ may be used to 
determine uncertain failure data of components.  
Fuzzy Logic is a branch of mathematics which has the 
capability to deal with linguistic variables and it provides 
efficient way to draw conclusions from imprecise data. A 
variety of approaches (e.g. Suresh et al. (1996); Yang (2012))  
have been proposed based on fuzzy set theory to allow 
classical and dynamic fault tree analysis with uncertain data. 
Recently, a fuzzy set theory based methodology has been 
  
     
 
proposed by Kabir et al. (2014b) to quantify Pandora fault 
trees with uncertain data. In this method, fuzzy operators for 
the new fault tree gates have been developed and fuzzy data 
have been used in the quantitative analysis instead of fixed 
data. As a result, the system unreliability is obtained as fuzzy 
numbers. This methodology can also determine the criticality 
of system components based on their relative contributions to 
the occurrence of the system failure. By more explicitly 
highlighting the areas of uncertainty in the failure data, this 
method can lead to a more effective quantification of 
uncertainty in dynamic systems. It is important to highlight 
that the results of quantitative analysis can only be as reliable 
as the input data, and the inclusion of fuzzy data cannot 
improve the accuracy of the results. However, techniques 
such as importance measures allow analysts to see the 
relative contribution of different system elements to the 
overall failure probability. This helps to overcome the 
limitations of uncertain quantitative analysis results by 
focusing on the relative values rather than exact values, 
identifying the areas of the system design most sensitive to 
improvement.        
3.4 Architecture and Maintenance Optimisation  
Let us assume now that a team of analysts is designing a 
system, that we have decomposed the dependability 
requirements across the architecture, and that an analysis 
from a MBSA tool suggests that the system does not meet all 
of those dependability requirements. At this stage we need to 
improve the design somehow so that it does meet the 
requirements, as shown by a second round of analysis. There 
is typically a range of options available to improve a design, 
including:  
a)  replacing a component with a more reliable and expensive 
component  
b)  replacing part of the architecture with a more dependable 
alternative 
c)  replicating components in fault tolerant schemes so that 
failures are tolerated  
d) increasing the frequency of maintenance, an action that 
prolongs the useful life of components and thereby 
increases the reliability of the system. 
The difficulty is that in a typical system design, there is a 
very large number of possibilities for substitution, replication 
and maintenance scheduling. For instance, in a system of n 
components, if there are two suppliers for each component 
then there are 2n configurations which equates to 1.26e30 
configurations when n=100. Each configuration will have its 
own dependability and cost performance. It is clear that in 
such situations analysts are confronted with a multi-objective 
optimisation problem, where the objectives may include 
dependability, cost, weight and other properties.  
It would be prohibitively expensive to investigate more than a 
handful of these possible configurations manually. Therefore, 
to optimise such designs, we have developed an extension of 
HiP-HOPS that employs genetic algorithms to perform multi-
objective optimisation of architectures with respect to 
dependability and other attributes (Papadopoulos and Grante, 
2006; Papadopoulos et al., 2011). This is a separate 
optimisation process to the allocation of dependability 
requirements; architectural optimisation takes place as a way 
of finding a design that meets the devolved dependability 
requirements, which may themselves have been set as a result 
of an allocation optimisation process.  
The architectural optimisation concept is illustrated in Fig. . 
As with dependability analysis in HiP-HOPS, the process 
starts from a model of the system. However, this time the 
model is not fixed — it has variability, i.e., components can 
have multiple alternative implementations. These points of 
variability may involve different parameters of components 
or may involve architectural changes, e.g. replacing a single 
component with a more fault-tolerant design using primary 
and backup components. For example, a sensor can be chosen 
from two different suppliers, with each choice having its own 
cost, weight, performance, and failure characteristics. 
Subsystems can also carry alternatives, e.g. a subsystem can 
have two different implementations that provide the functions 
using different sets of components and different architectures. 
There can be options for replication of components with 
known patterns of fault tolerance, e.g. a primary-standby 
configuration, or multiple parallel channels with majority 
voting. Finally, there can be options for the scheduling of 
component maintenance. 
 
 Fig. 5. Architecture optimisation in HiP-HOPS. 
 
Once the system model has been annotated to include these 
variable possibilities and any further required information, 
including associated cost and failure data etc, the model is 
given to HiP-HOPS, which then applies an evolutionary 
optimisation process. In the context of this process, HiP-
HOPS creates a population of candidate designs by resolving 
the variability of the model, i.e., fixing variation points in the 
model by selecting particular design options. Each candidate 
design is then evaluated with respect to the objectives of the 
optimisation. The evaluation is performed using the analysis 
algorithms of HiP-HOPS. The reliability and availability of a 
candidate design are automatically calculated from the 
generated fault trees. A quantitative measure of safety is 
established from the FMEA, using, for instance, the number 
of single points of failure that contribute to severe system 
failures. HiP-HOPS also includes simple summative cost and 
weight functions. External plugins can also be designed to 
enable more precise evaluation of cost, weight or other 
  
     
 
objective functions. For example, experiments with timing 
and schedulability have been reported in (Walker et al., 
2013).  
Once candidate designs have been evaluated, they are ranked 
according to their performance and a Pareto frontier is 
formed showing the best designs in the current population. 
Roulette wheel selection, a random process biased towards 
the better performing designs, is used to select candidates to 
form the parents of the next generation. Through application 
of classic genetic operators such as mutation and crossover, a 
new population is then formed and the process of evaluation 
and ranking is iterated. The result of this process over a 
number of successive generations is a gradual improvement 
of the average performance of the population that is evident 
in the progressive improvement of the Pareto frontier. The 
process is terminated on meeting certain constraints or after a 
specified number of generations. The result is a set of models 
that give optimal or near optimal trade-offs among the 
objectives of the optimisation.  
Via this process, designers can take informed decisions about 
the selection of components, subsystems, the location and 
type of replication, and about maintenance scheduling, all the 
while making sure that dependability requirements can be 
met whilst minimising costs.  
As an example of this architectural optimisation process, 
HiP-HOPS was applied to a high-level abstract design of a 
vehicle pre-collision system and an evolutionary optimisation 
technique was used to achieve balanced solutions with 
respect to dependability and cost (Adachi et al., 2011).  
The pre-collision system is an automotive safety technology 
that avoids or reduces the damage caused by a collision. The 
system supports drivers by issuing warnings when a potential 
collision threat is identified and activates emergency braking 
if the driver fails to apply the brakes. To improve system 
fault tolerance, a number of fault tolerance mechanisms were 
considered. These mechanisms may be applied to various 
locations in the system architecture to achieve greater 
dependability, albeit at an increased cost. The mechanisms 
include self-protection, self-checking, checkpoint-restart and 
process-pair. Self-protection and self-checking are functions 
which can be used for error detection. In self-protection, the 
component protects itself from external disturbances by 
detecting errors propagated from other components. In self-
checking, a component detects internal errors and prevent the 
propagation of those errors to other components.  
Checkpoint-restart not only detects failures, but also recovers 
from errors by restarting the component. Finally, process-
pair is a fault tolerance technique which uses redundancy 
realised by two identical software components. These are 
typical mechanisms for detection and correction of errors 
which give a sophisticated range of options to consider in 
early design. To model situations where these fault tolerant 
components miss some failures which need to be detected, an 
additional event miss was included in the analysis. Fault 
tolerant mechanisms may also experience failure, so the event 
failure is used to represent internal malfunction for the fault 
tolerant components. Information on failure expression and 
failure rate were included for each of the components in the 
system with reasonable assumptions about plausible 
hardware and software failures. The HiP-HOPS optimisation 
algorithm was finally employed to select the optimal location 
and types of fault-tolerance mechanisms in an improved 
version of the system. From a total design space of about 127 
 3.6×107, in just 5 minutes it was able to find 8 Pareto 
optimal solutions that provided a good trade-off between risk 
and cost while meeting the required constraints (see Adachi 
et al (2011) for further information).  
The case study showed that insight into the optimal use of 
fault tolerance can be arrived at much more rapidly with the 
aid of automated tool support. The vast number of different 
options, let alone the time required to evaluate and compare 
these options, would make an equivalent manual process 
infeasible. Thus metaheuristic approaches allow a designer to 
obtain significant improvements in reliability and cost 
performance. 
3.5 Model transformations from Architecture Description 
Languages 
HiP-HOPS has also been used to support the development 
and analysis of systems modelled using Architecture 
Description Languages (ADLs), particularly the Architecture 
Analysis & Design Language (AADL) (www.aadl.info) and 
the automotive EAST-ADL (www.east-adl.info). 
EAST-ADL provides an integrated and systematic support 
for the modelling of automotive systems. The growing 
adoption of model-based engineering techniques like 
EAST-ADL is driven by the need to better-manage advances 
in functionality and corresponding increases in the 
complexity of modern safety-critical embedded systems.  The 
specification of EAST-ADL includes an error model which 
describes potential failures of design elements.  
To enable advanced analysis capabilities like FTA, FMEA, 
optimisation and safety requirement allocations, the 
EAST-ADL error model is extended with HiP-HOPS 
semantics. This integration requires translation of models in 
the automotive domain to models in the safety analysis 
domain, i.e., a transformation of an EAST-ADL error model 
to a corresponding HiP-HOPS model. The concrete source 
and destination models are both represented in XML-based 
formats, which are EAXML and HiP-HOPS XML 
respectively. The translator tool is described in (Sharvia et 
al., 2014). It involves conceptual semantic mapping between 
the domains and the representation of concrete models.  
The benefits of ADL’s such as EAST-ADL and AADL 
depend crucially on the availability of tools.  Model 
transformation has been used make the optimisation 
capabilities of HiP-HOPS available to AADL models (Mian 
et al., 2014).  At the highest level of abstraction, the 
transformation consists of two parts. One part is concerned 
with the component specific error behaviour and the other 
part is concerned with the inter-component error propagation. 
AADL uses an Error Model Annex for modelling component 
failure behaviour. Error models in AADL are state machines 
which specify how the state of a component changes in 
response to events or the states of other components. The 
  
     
 
model transformation incorporates a state machine to fault 
tree conversion algorithm described in Mahmud et al. (2012). 
This preserves the temporal properties captured in the state-
machine.  
The Atlas Transformation Language (ATL) (Jouault et al., 
2008) is used to implement the transformation which has 
been developed as a plug-in for the AADL model 
development tool OSATE 
(https://wiki.sei.cmu.edu/aadl/index.php/Osate_2, accessed 
2015).  
4. TECHNICAL DISCUSSION 
Key to all of the approaches presented in section 3 is the 
underlying system model in HiP-HOPS. At its core this is a 
architectural model that shows system elements and possible 
data, material, or energy flows between them. In the HiP-
HOPS tool, this model can be exported from widely-used 
system modelling packages including Matlab Simulink 
(Mathworks, 2016), SimulationX (ITI, 2016), and various 
Eclipse-based UML modelling platforms such as Papyrus 
(Eclipse Foundation, 2016). As described in section 3.3, this 
model is further annotated with logical descriptions of the 
local failure behaviour of system elements. HiP-HOPS can 
then use this information to build a failure propagation 
network, describing how failures propagate through the 
system and revealing the dependencies between the different 
system elements. Because HiP-HOPS models are generated 
automatically from existing engineering models, it is easy to 
make modifications to the actual system model and then very 
quickly observe the effect this has on the analysis results. 
Similarly, to support the different optimisation processes, 
HiP-HOPS requires information about the different 
possibilities. For decomposition of dependability 
requirements, it requires data on the system-level functional 
safety requirements, the cost heuristic to be used, and also 
what SIL algebra is to be used. For architectural optimisation, 
more detailed information is required in the form of different 
alternative implementations for each component to be used as 
a variability point, whether in the form of different 
parameters (e.g. cost, weight, reliability, maintenance 
schedules) or different sub-architectures (e.g. series, parallel, 
fault tolerance schemes).  
Clearly, it is important for the model and its associated 
information to be correct. The failure propagation model is 
used to ensure independence between decomposed sub-
elements of the system, without which the analysis results 
will be in error and the allocation of dependability 
requirements will be invalid. Consequently, we have made 
efforts towards improving the expressiveness of the HiP-
HOPS model and its annotations, including modelling 
dynamic behaviour as explained in section 3.3.2 and for 
uncertain data as in 3.3.3.  
However, due to the fact that analysis takes no more than a 
few seconds even for large systems with hundreds of 
components and many thousands of cut sets, it is relatively 
easy to identify errors, correct them in the model, and 
regenerate the analysis results compared to the effort that 
would be required to repeat a full manual safety analysis. The 
HiP-HOPS tool also performs a range of checks and reports 
various warnings and errors when it detects potential errors in 
the modelling or the failure annotations.  
There are other limitations to our current work, typically 
consequences of being based on an easy-to-use Boolean logic 
rather than more complex state-based approaches. Logical 
loops in the failure propagation can be problematic (though 
are often symptomatic of modelling errors) and for this 
reason the tool works better at higher levels rather than on 
low-level electronic circuits. Repairable components are 
supported by the core safety analysis but not by all of the 
experimental extensions to the tool. Nevertheless, we are 
continually undertaking further work to try to address many 
of these limitations. 
Ultimately any analysis is only as good as the  data it is based 
on, and we rely upon the designers to provide accurate failure 
data for their system models. 
5. RELEVANT WORK 
There is very little work reported in linking MBSA to 
metaheuristics. In (Konak et al., 2007) systems are 
represented as Reliability Block Diagrams (RBDs) which are 
subsequently optimised using meta-heuristics. HiP-HOPS 
supersedes this work by enabling optimisation of models 
which may have a networked architecture, i.e. they are not 
necessarily in parallel or series configurations as RBDs, and 
overcome the traditional assumption made in RBDs that a 
component or system either works or fails in a single failure 
mode. HiP-HOPS has been the first approach to direct 
optimisation of dependability on an architectural model. 
Other tools for architecture optimisation, with the possibility 
of adding arbitrary quality properties as objectives, include 
ArcheOpteryx (Aleti et al., 2009) and PerOpteryx (Koziolek, 
2011). The scope of these tools includes architecture 
optimisation but does not include the requirements allocation 
problem.  
These tools require a reliability evaluation model such as a 
fault tree, RBD or Markov Chain for evaluating reliability. 
HIP-HOPS re-synthesises this model during the evolution of 
the system architecture by operating directly on an 
architectural model augmented with failure data. HiP-HOPS 
has also incorporated the first effort directed towards 
automatic allocation of dependability requirements 
(Papadopoulos et al., 2010) and remains the only application 
of metaheuristics in this area. Mader et al. (2012) proposed 
an approach for ASIL allocation where a linear programming 
optimisation problem is formulated to discover a solution that 
minimises the sum of ASILs as-signed across the system 
architecture. Zhang et al. (2010) proposed a workflow for 
embedded system development, which includes fault trees, 
FMEA and ASIL allocation based on a qualitative risk graph 
method. Dhouibi et al. (2014) introduced a method for ASIL 
allocation which is based on interpreting the allocation 
problem as a system of linear equations. Bieber et al. (2011) 
presented a theory to formalise the ARP4754-A DAL 
allocation rules and the DALculator tool to support automatic 
DAL allocation via integer programming optimisation. The 
starting point for these approaches are minimal cut sets of 
fault trees. Instead, HiP-HOPS starts from architectural 
  
     
 
models, offering the advantage of being able to assess 
explicit or implicit dependencies in the model and its 
environment that may cause common mode failures.  
  6. CONCLUSIONS 
The technologies of model-based design, dependability 
analysis and the application of heuristics to the design of 
dependable systems, including software intensive systems, 
have advanced in recent years. However, we have not yet 
seen the emergence of a design paradigm that employs these 
techniques synergistically and systematically from the early 
stages of design to enable cost-effective, dependability-driven 
optimal design refinement.  
In this paper, we have outlined four challenges that remain 
unaddressed and sketched a model-centric paradigm for the 
design of dependable systems that brings these technologies 
together to realise their potential benefits. These benefits 
include:  
 controlling dependability from the early stages via 
optimal allocation of requirements;  
 effective top-down distribution and then bottom-up 
composition of dependable designs in collaborative 
environments, distributed across complex value chains;  
 automation in the assessment of design proposals and 
prediction of dependability;  
 decision support on optimisation of architectures for 
component selection, fault tolerance and maintenance 
scheduling;  
 reuse of repositories of models and analyses both during 
design refinement and across projects.  
Tackling the wide range of requirements to obtain these 
benefits requires a model-based design paradigm that draws 
upon state-of-the-art developments and knowledge from 
multiple fields, building on classical and temporal logic, 
biology-inspired metaheuristic techniques and modern 
model-based engineering principles. In this paper, we have 
shown that such a paradigm is feasible by discussing its 
embryonic incarnation within the HiP-HOPS method and 
tool. HiP-HOPS is presently the only MBSA method that 
applies metaheuristics across the lifecycle including the very 
early stages, addressing both requirements and architecture. 
The transferability of this work in model-based design has 
been demonstrated in the context of architecture description 
languages such as EAST-ADL (Walker et al., 2013) and 
AADL (Mian et al., 2014).   
We do not claim that we have addressed the enormous 
challenges discussed in section 2. Our modest aim was to 
show that this synthesis of bio-inspired techniques with logic 
has the potential to improve the field of MBSA by enabling 
useful functionalities that were previously unexplored. This is 
where we see the value of the paper and we hope that this 
modest claim has been substantiated. Our experiments, which 
are described in many of the references, show practical 
improvement in design using these functionalities. One can 
see Pareto fronts of generated solutions moving towards 
better and better tradeoffs. We have still not attempted a 
systematic quantification of these improvements. One way to 
achieve this is by tasking engineers with developing solutions 
to problems also solved with the aid of metaheuristics.  One 
could then plot these solutions on Pareto fronts and could 
measure the distance in performance between manually 
derived and automatic solutions.   
There are of course many other challenges that remain to be 
addressed as this work develops further within the field of 
model-based design and MBSA. These include the 
representativeness and completeness of models, the relation 
of models to code, the modelling and analysis of commercial 
off-the-shelf or legacy systems, the efficacy of automatic 
model-transformations in the context of optimisation and the 
scalability of models with respect to computational cost of 
analyses. 
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